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Judicial Review — Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine — 
Public Service Labour Relations Act (N.B.) — Cana- 
dian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New 
Brunswick Liquor Corporation
In the last decade the courts have m aintained a high profile in 
reviewing the decisions o f adm inistrative tribunals. In the face o f 
privative clauses courts have labelled erro rs o f law- as jurisdictional. 
In England the characterization has become so liberal that one learned 
au th o r has suggested with concern that,
if  the widest possible effect is given to the reasoning o f  the House o f  Lords in 
the Anisminic case, it could be said that every error o f  law by a tribunal 
necessarily means that the tribunal asked itself the wrong question or acted on 
irrelevant considerations; and that therefore every error o f law is an excess o f  
jurisdiction.1
T h e recent case, Canadian Union o f Public Employees, Local 963, v. New  
Brunswick Liquor Corporation,2 indicates that the Suprem e Court o f 
C anada may have tu rned  the tide on this trend  in Canada, at least with 
respect to Labour Relations Boards.
A com plaint was laid with the New Brunswick Public Service Labour 
Relations Board by the Union alleging that du ring  the course o f  a legal 
strike the em ployer was replacing striking employees with m anagem ent 
personnel contrary to s. 10‘2(3)(a) o f  the Act.3 T h e  em ployer denied that 
it was contravening the section and countered  that the Union was 
picketing in violation o f s. 102(3)(¿>), which provides that:
102(3). Where sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) áre complied with, 
employees may strike and during the continuance o f  the strike
(a) the employer shall not replace the striking em ployees or Fill their 
position with any other employee, and,
(b ) no employee shall picket, parade or in any manner demonstrate in or 
near any place o f  business o f  the employer.
A fter hearing the complaint, the Board determ ined that the 
allegation o f  the em ployer, in relation to picketing, was well founded. A 
cease and desist o rd e r was issued. T h e  Board also determ ined that the 
U nion’s com plaint was well founded and o rdered  that the em ployer also 
cease and desist. Only the latter finding, with respect to the em ployer’s 
conduct, was challenged in the courts.
'H . W. R. Wade, Administrative Law (4th ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) at 257. 
*(1979), 25 N.B.R. (2d) 237.
3Public Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-25.
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Before the Board the em ployer had alleged that s. 102(3) prohibited 
an em ployer only from  replacing striking employees with another 
employee. As it had replaced employees with m anagem ent it argued that 
it had not contravened the section. As well, the em ployer argued that 
the intent o f the section was to keep jobs open for the employees after 
the strike ended.. This being so, the tem porary  replacem ent o f  striking 
employees with m anagem ent was not in contravention o f the section. 
T h e  Board rejected both these argum ents. T he  C ourt o f Appeal, while 
rejecting the first argum ent, agreed with the second, and quashed the 
decision o f  the Board.
T he  Public Service Labour Relations Act contains a privative clause:
s. 101(1). Except as provided in this Act, every order, award, direction, 
decision, declaration or ruling o f  the Board, the Arbitration Tribunal or an 
adjudicator is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court, 
s. 101(2). No order shall be made or process entered, and no proceedings 
shall be taken in any court, whether by way o f  injunction, certiorari, pro­
hibition, quo warranto, or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain 
the Board, the Arbitration Tribunal or an adjudicator in any o f  its or his 
proceedings.
In o rder, therefore, to quash the finding o f  the Board, it was necessary 
for the C ourt o f Appeal to characterize the e rro r as jurisdictional 
thereby negating the protection afforded by s. 101.
T h e  C ourt o f  Appeal did this by a two-fold characterization o f the 
issue.4 First, the Board, it said, is em pow ered to inquire into a com plaint 
that an em ployer has failed to observe a prohibition in the Act. Second, 
it is not em pow ered to determ ine what is prohibited by the Act nor to 
in terpret the Act except insofar as it is necessary to determ ine its 
jurisdiction.
By characterizing the issue in this way the C ourt o f  Appeal set the 
fram ework for determ ining that the B oard’s interpretation o f what 
constituted a prohibition under the section was a condition precedent to 
giving it jurisdiction. It was, therefore, a jurisdictional question to which 
a w rong determ ination  would give rise to the intervention o f the court 
by way of judicial review. Although the C ourt o f Appeal found that the 
section “bristles with am biguities”5, it concluded that the Board, by 
m isin terpreting the Act, had wrongly assumed jurisdiction.
T h e  Suprem e C ourt o f C anada reversed the C ourt o f Appeal and 
restored the o rd e r o f  the Board. Mr. Justice Dickson, speaking for the 
full court, held that:
4( 1978), 2. N.B.R (2d) 441 (N.B.C.A.).
5Supra, footnote 2, at 240.
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With respect, I do not think that the language o f  "preliminary or collateral 
matter” assists in the inquiry into the Board’s jurisdiction. One can, I suppose, 
in most circumstances, subdivide the matter before an administrative tribunal 
into a series o f  tasks or questions and, without too much difficulty, 
characterize one o f  those questions as a “preliminary or collateral matter.6
His Lordship went on to say:
The question o f  what is and is not jurisdictional is often very difficult to 
determine. The courts, in my view, should not be alert to brand as 
jurisdictional, and therefore subject to broad or curial review, that which mav 
be doubtfully so.
T he approach p re ferred  by the Suprem e C ourt o f  Canada was to 
determ ine the B oard’s jurisdiction at the outset o f the inquiry. T he  court 
recognized that it was necessary for the Board to determ ine w hether o r 
not the com plaint which had been lodged with it was well founded. 
Certainly the Board had power to em bark on this inquiry; this was 
exactly what the Act contem plated. T herefo re , it could be said that the 
existence o f a prohibition was not a condition precedent to the Board’s 
jurisdiction. In this m anner, the Suprem e C ourt distinguished the 
authorities relied on in the C ourt o f A ppeal.7
As the Board had jurisdiction to em bark on the inquiry, the only 
question rem aining for the court was, did the Board lose this jurisdiction 
in the course o f the inquiry by placing a patently unreasonable 
determ ination on the construction o f the section and thereby em bark on 
an inquiry not rem itted to it? If  so, it would lose jurisdiction. If not, its 
decision would be protected by s. 101.
T h e  Suprem e C ourt o f C anada observed, as had the C ourt of 
Appeal, that s. 102(3) was am biguous. T h ere  could be no l ight o r wrong 
interpretation. T he  m ere fact that the Board placed on the section an 
in terpretation differen t from one that the court may prefer did not 
ren d er the B oard’s in terpretation unreasonable. In o rd e r to determ ine 
the reasonableness o f the interpretation used by the Board, Dickson }., 
exam ined the purpose o f s. 102.
In a careful analysis o f  the purposes o f the section in the scheme of 
public service labour relations, His Lordship noted that it was the 
intention o f the legislature to m aintain a balance o f power between 
em ployer and employee: on the one hand, to avoid picket lines outside 
governm ent buildings, and on the o ther, to limit the em ployer’s right to 
replace striking employees. T h ere  was a necessary trade-off entailed in 
limiting the norm al right o f an employee to picket and this was achieved 
by limiting the right o f  the em ployer to m aintain a high level o f service.
•Ibid., at 243.
7Re Jacmain (1977), 18 N.R. 361 (S.C.C.); Jarvis v. Associated Medical Sennces Ltd. et al. (1976), 44 D.L.R. 
(2d) 407 (S.C.C.); Parkhill Bedding (if Furniture v. International Molders &  Foundry Workers Union o f N. 
Amenca. Local 174 (1961), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 589 (Man. C.A.).
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View ing the section in the context, not o f  labour relations generally, 
but in the narrow er context o f  public service labour relations, the court 
accepted that the in terpretation placed on this section by the Board 
was reasonable. T o  in terp re t the section otherw ise would cause 
the sterilization o f  the right to strike by the employee with no coun ter­
vailing restriction on the em ployer. His Lordship concluded that 
the B oard’s in terpretation  was at least as reasonable as the alternative 
interpretations suggested in the C ourt o f  A ppeal.8 T herefore, the Board 
could not be said to have m isinterpreted the provision in question so as 
to em bark on an inquiry o r answer a question not rem itted to it.
T h e  decision o f the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada is significant for two. 
reasons. First, it addresses the problem  o f  determ ining the appropriate  
relationship between judicial review by the courts and the finality o f 
decisions o f specialized adm inistrative agencies. Second, it acknowledges 
that the court should, before analyzing the actions o f a specialized 
tribunal, be m indful o f  the purpose o f legislation establishing that 
tribunal and not in terpret individual sections by literal canons o f 
construction thereby frustrating  the broader purposes o f  the Act.
Judicial review o f  the decisions o f adm inistrative agencies is 
concerned with legality o f  action. It exists to ensure that statutory 
tribunals do not exceed the authority  vested in them  by the legislature. 
Judicial review in these circumstances is based on the principle o f ultra 
vires. T he  only exception to this is the rem edy by way o f certiorari for 
e rro r o f law on the face o f the record which enables the court to quash a 
decision which appears bad on its face. This rem edy is available where 
the e rro r o f  law is not jurisdictional. However, the existence o f  a 
privative clause protects non-jurisdictional erro rs from  review on this 
ground. W here, therefore, a privative clause exists, the court is restricted 
to reviewing for ultra vires action. T h at is the situation in the case under 
discussion. T h e  Suprem e Court o f C anada recognized the distinction. 
Dickson J., exam ined the privative clause, and observed that it was “a 
clear statutory direction on the part o f the Legislature that public 
sector labour m atters be prom ptly and finally decided by the B oard”. 
He found the rationale for protection o f  the B oard’s decisions within 
jurisdiction com pelling “T he labour board is a specialized tribunal which 
adm inisters a com prehensive statute regulating labour relations”.9 This 
is a clear indication that the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada intends to 
m aintain the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
errors. T his decision has been reinforced in at least two o ther recent 
Suprem e Court o f  C anada decisions dealing with Labour Relations
*Supra. footnote 2. at 251. The Court of Appeal was not unanimous in its interpretation.
*Supra. footnote 2. at 245.
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issues.10 It seems clear that the court will be slow to characterize as 
jurisdictional that which is dubiously so.
T h e  m ethod o f statutory in terpretation  used by the court also 
influences the outcom e. In the C U PE  case, the C ourt o f  Appeal adopted 
ra th er literal in terpretations o f s. 102. O n the o ther hand, the Suprem e 
C ourt o f C anada showed sensitivity to the purposes o f the legislation 
dealing with labour relations and particularly to the special natu re  o f the 
balancing o f powers required  in public service labour relations. Dickson 
J., drew  attention to the fact that the rules norm ally applicable to 
conflicts between em ployer and em ployee had been altered by s. 102 o f 
the Public Service Labour Relations Act and it was therefore necessary to 
in terp re t s. 102 in a m anner which sustained the altered status o f both 
parties.
An additional point o f  interest is that His Lordship noted that, 
before the Board, the Union had taken no jurisdictional objection, nor 
had the em ployer.11 This may suggest that the court will be unsym pathetic 
to technical argum ents raised with hindsight to bring m atters before 
the court u n d e r the guise o f  jurisdictional questions.
SANDRA K. MCCALLUM*
10International Union, United Automobile Workers, Local 720 v. Volvo Canada Ltd. (1979), 27 N.R. 502 
(S.C.C.); McConnell et al. v. Douglas Aircraft Co. (1979), 29 N.R. 109 (S.C.C.).
"Supra, footnote 2, at 244.
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